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The “Human Mental State Multiple Realizability in Silicon Thesis” is False: 
An Argument Against Computational Theories of Consciousness 
 
Matthew Piper 
 
1. Abstract 
 
Two of the most important concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind are 
computation and consciousness.  This paper explores whether there is a “strong” 
relationship between these concepts in the following sense: is a computational theory 
of consciousness possible?  That is, is the right kind of computation sufficient for the 
instantiation of consciousness?  In this paper, I argue that the abstract nature of 
computational processes precludes computations from instantiating the concrete 
properties constitutive of consciousness.  If this is correct, then not only is there no 
viable computational theory of consciousness, the Human Mental State Multiple 
Realizability in Silicon Thesis is almost certainly false.   
  
2. Introduction 
 
The HMSMRST is the Human-Mental-State-Multiple-Realizability-in-Silicon 
Thesis, which holds that silicon-based systems having artificial experience1 can be 
physically constructed (i.e., silicon-based machine consciousness is physically 
possible).  Although computers need not be made from silicon, they are the 
archetypal, and most complex, silicon-based systems.  So, on the most plausible 
reading, the HMSMRST is true if computers can be conscious.  Given that common 
sense suggests that computers are not conscious, the burden for proponents of the 
HMSMRST, given that the sine qua non of computers is computation, is to provide a 
computational theory of consciousness.   
 
In this paper, I argue that all computational theories of consciousness (CTCs) 
fail.  CTCs hold that the right kind of computation is sufficient for the instantiation of 
consciousness.  Given the widely-recognized importance of his work, I will use David 
J. Chalmers’ Thesis of Computational Sufficiency as a paradigm case.  I will argue 
that it fails for a reason that can be formalized as a general problem plaguing any 
CTC: the medium-independent properties (MIPs) constitutive of computational 
processes are insufficient to instantiate the medium-dependent properties (MDPs) 
constitutive of consciousness.  MIPs, like graphemes, are properties whose causal role 
(e.g., symbolic meaning) does not depend upon the physical properties of the vehicles 
by which the relevant information is transferred (e.g., paper), while MDPs, like 
digestion, have causal roles (e.g., decomposition) that directly depend on physical 
properties of the relevant vehicles (e.g., enzymes).  Since computations, as abstract 
descriptions, are MIPs, they must be implemented to generate MDPs.  However, this 
makes potential implementation properties central to the feasibility of instantiating 
consciousness in artificial systems.                                                           
1 “Artificial experience” denotes the instantiation of phenomenal consciousness in non-biological 
artifacts/systems.   
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The problems that arise for CTC advocates are two-fold, taxonomical and 
empirical.  The taxonomic problem is that adverting to detailed physio-causal 
properties of implementation vehicles threatens to subvert the legitimacy of calling 
such theories “computational.”  The empirical problem is the following.  Given the 
necessary role of implementation properties, and the fact that functions supervene on 
structures, it follows that physical differences can legislate mental differences.  After 
distinguishing weaker and stronger varieties of implementation requirements, and 
showing why a plausible CTC requires a thick theory of implementation, I will 
examine the implementation requirements for human consciousness.   Given 
empirical data suggesting that consciousness depends on very specific physical 
properties of the brain, for which there are no known implementation surrogates, I 
argue that CTCs will fail to generate the relevant MDPs.  I will conclude by showing 
why this implies that the HMSMRST is almost certainly false.  
 
The outline of this paper is as follows.   In § 3, I will explain Chalmers’ 
Thesis of Computational Sufficiency (TCS).  In § 4, I will argue that Chalmers need 
for implementation properties either makes his account computationally vacuous or 
false, in the case of human consciousness.  Either way, the TCS cannot carry the 
weight asked of it.  In § 5, I will respond to objections.  In § 6, I will show that 
Chalmers’ TCS fails for reasons that are applicable to all CTCs, and I will formulate a 
general argument against CTCs based upon the difference between MIPs and MDPs.  
In § 7, I will consider objections to this general argument.  In § 8, I spell out the 
implication of the foregoing for the HMSMRST, and then summarize the route taken 
in § 9.2   
 
3. Chalmers’ Thesis of Computational Sufficiency 
 
In the essay, A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition (1994) 3, 
Chalmers argues for the Thesis of Computational Sufficiency, which is essentially the 
following:4                                                            
2 This paper will assume that one set of properties can realize another set of properties (e.g., structural 
properties realizing functional properties).  Such property sets will, in general, be related 
mereologically.  In some cases, it is possible that what appears to be one set of properties (X) realizing 
another (Y) is actually a case of one set of properties (X) known under two different modes of 
presentation (X1 and X2) (cf. Shoemaker’s subset account of properties (2007)).  
3 Despite the title of the paper in view, theories of cognition are not my target.  I am not contesting 
Chalmers’ claims in those regards, and am, in fact, sympathetic to many aspects of a computational 
approach to cognition.  That having been said, Fodor (2008) presents some key obstacles any theory of 
cognition must overcome (esp. chapter 4).  Thus, the CTC arguments presented here are tangential to 
(and this paper is agnostic regarding) the viability of computational theories of cognition in general 
(including Chalmers’).  
4 This argument is also presented in chapters 7 and 9 of Chalmers (1996) book, The Conscious Mind.  
The unpublished (1994) paper will be the chief reference as it is a relatively concise statement, 
containing a minimum of extraneous material, whose import is generally recognized: notably, only 3 
months after the submission of this paper to the Journal of Consciousness Studies, the Journal of 
Cognitive Science announced a Call for Papers solely on responses to Chalmers’ unpublished (1994) 
paper! 
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(P1) “A computation provides an abstract specification of the causal organization of 
a system.” (p. 11) 
 
(P2) “Cognitive systems have their mental properties in virtue of their [abstract] 
causal organization.” (p. 11)  
 
(C1) “The right kind of computational structure suffices for possession of a mind.” (p. 
1) 
 
Let us look at each step of the argument.5   
 
(P1) Chalmers’ argument rests upon a causal theory of computation (CC).  
According to CC, a system implements computation X if there is an isomorphism 
between the causal relations between the states of the physical system Y and the state 
transitions specified by the formal description of X.  Thus, the key feature is “that the 
formal state-transitional structure of the computation mirrors the causal state-
transitional structure of the physical system.” (Chalmers, 1994; p. 4)  Given CC, P1 
holds by definition: computations preserve abstract causal organization (ACO) since, 
syntactically speaking, they are nothing above and beyond ACOs.   
 
(P2) The idea behind P2 is that, unlike most properties, mental properties 
depend only upon ACO.  Properties depending only upon ACO are, in Chalmers’ 
words, “organizationally invariant.”  By organizational invariance, Chalmers means 
that “[i]t does not matter how we stretch, move about, or replace small parts of a 
cognitive system: as long as we preserve its causal topology, we will preserve its 
mental properties.”  (ibid., p. 12) That is, Chalmers argues that mental properties 
depend only upon the abstract organization of a system’s causal patterns and not the 
causal realizers as such.  In other words, as long as the ACO between two systems is 
invariant, they will share the same mental properties, if any.  In order to argue that 
computation (individuated causally) is sufficient for the possession of a (conscious) 
mind, Chalmers claims that mental properties are of two kinds, psychological and 
phenomenological, and then argues that each kind of property is organizationally 
invariant.   
  
Psychological properties (Chalmers gives “belief and perception” as 
examples) are declared to be those “characterized by their causal role” within an 
overall causal system.  Chalmers adverts to the work of Armstrong (1968) and Lewis 
(1972) in claiming that “[s]ystems with the same causal topology…will share their 
psychological properties” (Chalmers, 1994; p. 12).  The basic idea is consonant with 
Functionalist theories of mind, in which mental properties are individuated by their                                                         
5 Although the argument as stated here is formally invalid, it serves the purpose of presenting the basic 
ideas in the author’s own words.  Charitably, one valid form of the argument might be the following: 
(P1) Computations = ACOs.  (P2) The implementation of some ACOs is sufficient for realizing mental 
properties.  (C1) The implementation of some computations is sufficient for realizing mental 
properties.   
   4 
functional roles within a system, as opposed to any physical properties per se.  If this 
is right, then a CC should instantiate any psychological properties a system would 
possess in virtue of preserving ACO.  
 
Phenomenological properties, on the other hand, are not prima facie definable 
in terms of their causal roles, as Chalmers himself admits.  Establishing that 
phenomenological properties can be accounted for via ACO therefore requires 
argument.  Chalmers provides his “Dancing Qualia” Argument (DQA) – a reductio – 
for this purpose.  Chalmers begins by assuming that agents with identical ACOs could 
have different experiences in virtue of having different material constitutions (silicon 
vs. neurons, e.g.), as type-physicalism might require.  He then asks us to conceive of 
changing one agent into the other by the replacement of parts (neural parts replaced 
by silicon, say) while preserving its ACO.6  Ex hypothesi, the experience of the agent 
under transformation would change (as the parts were replaced), but there would be 
no change in abstract causal organization and therefore no means whereby the agent 
could “notice,” as he puts it, the shift in experience.  To imagine, however, that it 
makes sense to say an agent could have qualitative changes in experience but be 
unable to notice those changes in experience seems incoherent.  Given the absurdity 
of the conclusion, therefore, Chalmers’ rejects the initial premise that agents with 
identical ACO can have different experiences.  Thus, by his DQA, Chalmers defends 
his view that phenomenological properties are organizationally invariant.  Having 
argued that both types of mental properties – psychological and phenomenological – 
are organizationally invariant, Chalmers has defended P2.        
 
(C1)  In arguing for the TCS, Chalmers advocates a CC, in which a 
computation is simply an abstract specification of causal organization.  Accordingly, 
if computations are ACOs, as P1 argues, and some ACOs are sufficient for mental 
properties, as P2 argues, then some computations are sufficient for mental properties, 
and C1, “the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a 
mind,” straightforwardly follows.  Interestingly, as Chalmers admits, there are no 
positive proposals for what kind/type of computational structure is sufficient for 
consciousness.  In any case, to a first approximation, such is Chalmers’ argument for 
the TCS.  
 
The core point for our purposes is that Chalmers presents the TCS as a CTC.7  
In other words, it holds that computation is sufficient for the instantiation of (both 
psychological and phenomenological properties of) consciousness.  Let us turn to a 
critique of the TCS, arguably the most well-known and direct CTC on offer.  After 
exposing a critical dilemma, I will eventually argue that it is symptomatic of a more 
general problem undermining all CTCs.                                                          
6 Of course, this assumes that the relevant causal organization can be preserved when changing 
structures, which begs the question against type-physicalists.  See below.     
7 Chalmers’ TCS is arguably the clearest and most straightforward CTC.  A small selection of other 
authors developing or working towards CTC accounts include Mathis and Mozer (1996), Cotterill 
(1998), Haikonen (2003), Holland (2003), Aleksander (2005), Sloman (2005), Cleermans (2005), Rolls 
(2007), Ballard (2010), Stuart (2010) and Chella and Manzotti (2011).  Later, I will argue that the 
problems infecting TCS apply, in a more general form, to all CTCs.  
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4. Critique of Chalmers’ Thesis of Computational Sufficiency 
 
Chalmers’ TCS is complex and subject to varied objections.8  To keep 
discussion manageable, I will restrict my objections to those concerning a 
fundamental tension that arises out of the deployment of the concept ACO.  As I’ll 
explain, Chalmers’ account faces the burden of either showing how abstract 
descriptions can generate real semantic properties or showing that silicon-based 
systems (SBSs) implementations can have all the kinds of concrete mechanisms 
whose activities are causally efficacious in the generation of human consciousness.  
As I’ll show, given this dilemma, and the best scientific evidence about the 
realization conditions of consciousness, the TCS proves false, vacuous or question-
begging.   
 
Obviously, ACO depends upon the concepts of abstraction, causation and 
organization.  Chalmers’ basic idea is that there is a basal level of causation (in the 
brain) that generates consciousness.  However, if mental properties are 
“organizationally invariant,” as he argues, it is not necessary to generate this causal 
activity in the exact medium-dependent manner it occurs in us; rather, it is only 
necessary to instantiate a computation whose states and transitions have a structure 
that is isomorphic to the transitions of the actual causal activity.  Before looking in 
more depth at the proposal, it will be helpful to consider the general idea in play.  
What is interesting about this thesis is that it might seem to assume that an abstract 
representation of causal organization can be productive.   
 
But is this putative assumption warranted?  It is unlikely.  Take a blueprint of 
a watch, faucet or computer.  What causal powers do such blueprints possess?  
Though they may be said to possess certain dispositional powers (if utilized by an 
engineer, perhaps), they are causally inert on their own.  However, they are most 
definitely ACOs.  Perhaps abstract specifications of causal organizations are, as a 
genus, causally impotent.  Similarly, I can lecture (with diagrams, mathematics and 
movies, no less) all day about the causal forces in solids that permit them to suspend 
objects (a drink, say), but these have yet to keep my coffee from falling to the floor.  
This is of course because descriptions qua descriptions – even when accurate 
formalisms of real causal properties – never possess the actual causal powers of such 
properties.  Why would we expect consciousness to be any different?                                                         
8 There is not room to mention, let alone discuss, all the objections to aspects of the TCS.  Certainly, 
David Chalmers has done the best job of cataloging replies (see his very helpful “Responses to articles 
on my work”).  Here, I will make only a few points.  Generally speaking, a number of writers have 
taken issue with Chalmers’ ambition for an account of computation.  Perhaps the most well-known 
objection comes from John Searle, who criticized computational accounts of the mind for trying to get 
semantic water from a syntactic well.  Roughly speaking, Searle’s “intrinsic intentionality” objection is 
that computations are individuated non-semantically (e.g., syntactically), and, given that human 
consciousness is self-evidently semantic, computations cannot instantiate human consciousness 
(Searle, 1980).  This objection dovetails with discussion below.  Other objections have been leveled 
against Chalmers’ principle of organizational invariance (e.g., Seager, 1995; Pelczar, 2008), which we 
will cover below, and Chalmers’ DQA and related thought experiments (e.g., Van Heuveln et al., 
1998; Bostrom, 2006), which we will not discuss, since Chalmers himself admits that his thought 
experiments are inconclusive at best (Chalmers, 1999). 
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As we have already seen, one aspect of Chalmers’ reply is his DQA thought 
experiment.  Although ingenious, its legitimacy depends on the assumption that a 
silicon chip can instantiate the relevant causal powers of a neuron, which, however, 
just begs the question (against a type-physicalist characterization of consciousness, 
e.g.).   
 
Tellingly, the difficulty reconciling the concepts “abstract” and “causal 
organization” can be clearly seen in Chalmers’ own attempts to deploy the synonym 
concept “organizational invariance.”  The TCS depends on the premise that mental 
properties are organizationally invariant.  As we saw above, organizational invariance 
obtains insofar as the physical deformation of a system, or system part, doesn’t affect 
its functional role; that is, organizational invariance is a property of systems 
characterized by ACO.  This is because as long as the abstract causal organization is 
unchanged (regardless of the concrete organization), the function of organizationally 
invariant systems will remain unchanged.   
 
Chalmers illustrates the concept of organizational invariance by contrast with 
properties that are not organizationally invariant, such as flying and digesting.   He 
explains that flying is not organizationally invariant because “we can move an 
airplane to the ground while preserving its causal topology, and it will no longer be 
flying” and digestion is not organizationally invariant because “if we gradually 
replace the parts involved in digestion with pieces of metal, while preserving causal 
patterns, after a while it will no longer be an instance of digestion…”  (Chalmers, 
1994; p. 9)  
 
However, contrary to Chalmers’ intent, the causal organizations that generate 
flying and digestion are exactly what are not conserved in these examples.  
Grounding the plane, in the first example, fails to replicate the requisite airflow 
patterns whose causal organization underpins the property of flying, while replacing 
digestive parts with metals in the second case fails to replicate the requisite enzyme 
patterns whose causal organization underpins the property of digestion.  Since 
Chalmers’ examples fail, it is unclear what the idea amounts to.  Perhaps Chalmers’ 
difficulties are to be expected given the nature of the complex concept he employs.   
 
The key tension within ACO is that “abstraction” is the glossing over of 
“causal” roles.  Straightforwardly, if anything is a concrete, medium-dependent 
property, real causation is; and if anything is a medium-independent property, 
abstraction is.  Real causation involves the transformation of real forces, while 
abstractions do not.  Thus, the causal properties of real forces are medium-dependent.  
Consider: the same force F (a bullet of mass M traveling at acceleration A, say) plays 
much different causal roles within different media (gas vs. water vs. glass vs. steel).  
Conversely, abstract properties are medium-independent because the vehicles utilized 
are irrelevant to their causal role.  For example, whether a number is written, spoken 
or simply thought (or otherwise) does not affect its relevant (mathematical) role.  
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So, what are common examples of ACOs?  Blueprints, models, maps, and 
simulations.  Now, I am not arguing that various scientists and philosophers haven’t 
made good use of blueprints, models, maps and simulations (and therefore the 
concept of ACO).  Obviously they have.  But the uses are descriptive.  No one gets 
wet from a faucet blueprint, a model of a storm front, or a map of the Great Lakes.  
Because ACOs are syntactic in nature, the properties of ACOs (unlike the properties 
of the entities they represent) are medium-independent, instantiation-independent.  
ACOs lack the intrinsic powers of the properties they formalize.   
 
Accordingly, it is inappropriate to apply ACO to the concrete phenomenon of 
consciousness because it makes no sense to hold something simultaneously medium-
dependent (concrete) and medium-independent (abstract) in respect of the same 
property.  While in the case of blueprints and maps, ACO may be an adequate 
characterization, in the case of real artifacts and terrain, real implementation details 
matter – abstract characterizations fail to instantiate the relevant features precisely 
because they are abstractions.  In other words, you can’t eat causal cake with an 
abstract fork.    
 
Above, I claimed that Chalmers faces a dilemma. It is this.  There are two 
aspects to Chalmers’ account: the computational formalism, which is a syntactic 
description of causal state-transitions, on the one hand, and an implementation 
requirement, on the other.  Chalmers accepts that a theory of mental properties must 
account for semantic properties.  Thus, he must explain how either the computational 
formalism or the implementation properties can account for such semantics.     
 
Chalmers clearly rejects the first option, stating “syntax may not be enough 
for semantics…” (ibid.; p. 13).  He agrees that abstract entities (such as 
algorithms/programs) are insufficient to generate real causal powers, let alone 
cognition or semantics.  In more detail he writes, “It is the program that is syntactic; it 
is the implementation that has semantic content….syntax may not be enough for 
semantics, but the right kind of causation is.” (ibid. Italics added.)  Thus, he accepts 
the second horn.  In order to account for the semantics of consciousness, he posits 
that they are derived from “real physical causation” implementation properties (ibid.).   
   
However, this invites two new problems.  First, if the “real physical 
causation” implementation details are the crucial ones for cognition, semantics and 
consciousness (ibid.), then a type-physicalist account becomes, to some degree, 
preferable, because the essential causal work is being done by physical properties.  To 
salvage a computational approach to consciousness, an advocate might hold that 
while physical tokening is necessary, it is the causal organization as given by the 
computational formalism that gives shape, so to speak, to the mental properties.  
However, it is unclear that this is different than (i.e., not extensionally equivalent to) 
garden-variety type-physicalism.  Any type-physicalist approach will hold that it is 
both the physical properties and their organizational relations that matter (Scheutz, 
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2001).  If this is right, calling such an approach “computational” begins to sound 
vacuous.9     
 
The second problem is that locating the semantics in causally real 
implementation properties has the consequence that physical implementation 
asymmetries can generate semantic asymmetries, which can preclude multiple 
realizability. This follows from the simple reason that not any substrate can 
implement any function.  No amount of CO2 or toilet tissue can implement a 
submarine or a quantum computer, e.g.  In general, the more complex the function in 
question, the more complex the substrate needed for its implementation.  Arguably, 
humans are categorically more complex than any thermodynamically inert SBS can 
be, given the complexity of the hierarchical nesting of thermodynamic work cycles 
concurrently causally efficacious in humans (cf. Kauffman, 2002; Collier, 2008).  
Accordingly, if the functions constitutive of consciousness are complex enough, then 
silicon-based systems will not possess enough structural degrees of freedom to 
implement the relevant properties.   
 
Below, I will argue that this is exactly the case.  However, even if my 
demonstration were deemed inconclusive, Chalmers’ argument remains critically 
question-begging.  His assertion that mental properties can be captured by the 
implementation of their abstract causal properties simply begs the question against 
those who would assert that consciousness is a medium-dependent phenomenon, not 
realizable in any abstract process (e.g., Block, 1978; Searle, 2004; Hill, 2009; 
McLaughlin, 2010; Polger, 2011).  Since it is quite unclear both what the causal 
organization of mental properties as instantiated in humans is, on the one hand, and 
whether other systems can implement our causal organization, on the other (cf. Kary 
and Mahner, 2002), this seems a bit gratuitous on his part.10  More specifically, 
Chalmers would seem to beg the question against anyone who holds that “the causal 
structure of a physical system (i.e., its causal complexity) is determined by its various 
physical states and their causal relations among each other…[because] then 
computation, and as a consequence functionalist descriptions, will not be able to 
cover and capture all aspects of the causal structure.” (Scheutz, 2001; p. 563)    
 
As we have seen, the TCS faces multiple objections.  First, if the TCS is taken 
to suggest that abstract formalisms can generate concrete phenomena, then it is 
simply false.  To escape from this, Chalmers holds that implementation properties are 
necessary for realizing mental properties, as implementation properties, being 
physical properties themselves, generate real physical causality, and so can account 
for the semantics of mental properties.  This, though, has two sequelae.  One, because 
the critical role is played by physical properties, it appears the theoretical uses are                                                         
9 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting the possibility of pressing Chalmers on this 
point.   
10 This is important because, pace Shoemaker (2007), human consciousness serves as the necessary 
indexicalization of our concepts of consciousness/qualia/phenomenology (McLaughlin, 2003).  The 
key point is that if we do not semantically ground phenomenology and qualia in/by human 
consciousness, we have no way of recognizing the truth value of our concepts (i.e., properly 
employing them). 
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readily available to type-physicalist approaches.  On this reading, the TCS is a 
somewhat vacuous account of computation, as all physicalist approaches would 
thereby become computational.  The second result is that because implementation 
properties are physical properties, physical differences become critical in the 
determination of mental properties.  The TCS, on this reading, is at least question-
begging, and, given the evidence discussed in § 6, below, likely false.   
 
5. Replies and Counters 
 
How might would-be defenders of the TCS reply to the objections in § 4?  
There are multiple considerations.   
 
First, it might be objected that my critique of ACO is misplaced given that 
because “causal relations” are what Functionalists take to be medium-independent 
(i.e., abstract), there is no tension within ACO.  This is tangential to my point, 
however.  Certainly, “causal relations,” as typically adverted to in the literature, 
denote causal pattern-descriptions (without the instantiated forces), and hence are 
abstract.  But causal relations, qua abstract, formal descriptions, have no 
instantiation-dependent properties whatsoever.  To avoid the fallacy of reification, 
one must hold that causal relations need to be implemented to instantiate “real” 
properties.  Thus, what I take to be in tension are the concepts “abstract,” on the one 
hand, and, “causation,” on the other, within the context of implementation.  As they 
say, you can’t have your cake and eat it too.   
 
Second, a more substantive objection might be the following: It seems open to 
a defender of the TCS to say that, very obviously, the TCS can account for both the 
abstract (medium-independent) and concrete (medium-dependent) aspects of mental 
properties: the implementation generates the medium-dependent properties, while the 
ACO generates the medium-independent properties.  Accordingly, both the syntax 
and semantics are explained, and all objections countered.   
 
However initially attractive, adverting to the MDPs of an implementation as 
critical features of a TCS account invites the rejoinders encountered above.  As we 
saw, not only is it vacuous, or at least trivial, to call an approach that relies essentially 
on the physical properties of systems “computational,” but physical differences in 
implementation substrates, on this view, can be expected to generate semantic 
differences in certain contexts, or to preclude certain systems from implementing 
computations tout court.  This is because MDPs are not multiply realizable in a 
holistic sense.  So, different implementation substrates will have, and lack, different 
MDPs.  Chalmers himself is very clear that “for any given complex [computation], 
very few physical systems will have the causal organization required to implement it” 
(1996; p. 319).   It is not at odds with this latter point, for instance, to claim that, for 
“mechanical” reasons, the set of non-human implementations of human 
consciousness is zero, as I will argue in § 6.   
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But just which MDPs are necessary to generate the requisite mental states?  
And what is the relationship between implementation properties and phenomenal 
properties? 
 
One view – call it the thin theory of implementation – is that implementation 
details as such are tangential to phenomenology.  On this view, what is important is 
that there is a physical substrate – providing some real causality – of a computational 
process.  Other than the simple requirement of having enough parts to represent the 
informational states of the computation, what physical mechanisms operate between 
elements is tangential to phenomenology.  Chalmers’ position on the Chinese Room 
(1996; chapter 9) and elsewhere (e.g., 1994; p. 5) suggests this reading.  The idea is 
that no matter what the actual causal commerce between informational 
elements/symbols (slips of paper, cans and string, etc.), the fact of causal interaction 
simpliciter provides all the semantic grounding necessary.  On this view, 
implementations need not realize most of the MDPs of the original system; rather, the 
fact that there is an implementation substrate at all provides all the MDPs necessary.   
 
The problem here is bald implausibility.  Two illustrations should suffice to 
make the point.  First, imagine a huge network of slips of paper tied to each other in a 
fashion isomorphic to the causal commerce of a neural network whose instantiation in 
us generates consciousness.  Imagine that this network of string and paper slips is 
spread out over a plateau 1000 km2.  If a great wind blows over this plain, we can 
imagine that the slips of paper will change “states” depending on both the network of 
connections and the (input) energy from the wind (cf. Chalmers’ (1996; Chapter 9) 
discussion of the Chinese Room thought experiment).  Now, such a network is a 
concrete implementation of the ACO of a system whose activity generates 
consciousness.  Just as neural states affect one another, the slips of paper are so 
connected to each other (by the strings) that the activity in each paper partially 
determines the activity of others.  We can picture this grand network of strings and 
little slips of paper spread out over a massive plateau, rustling in the breeze.  So…is 
the system of strings and paper slips conscious?   
 
Chalmers very bravely claims “yes.”  To his way of thinking, the slips of 
paper purportedly capture the ACO of the real neural network that generates 
consciousness, and the strings and papers generate the real physical causality 
necessary for semantic content.  But, given that his argument for why ACO should 
generate phenomenology (his DQA, above) begged the question, there doesn’t seem 
to be any good reason to think a vast field of strings and paper slips should qualify as 
a conscious entity.  And there seem to be a number of obvious reasons that it 
shouldn’t.  One, the strings and paper fail to instantiate a unified substrate; the 
material collective of strings and paper is quite ad hoc and fails to resemble a natural 
kind, which minds and consciousness reasonably are.  Two, the system has no 
intrinsic dynamics.  While it is true that the system implements a pattern of rule 
transitions, as governed by string arrangements between papers, it has no intrinsic 
movement of its own.  It is essentially inert, and, as Searle argues, has no “intrinsic 
intentionality” (Searle, 2004).  Three, admitting that such a “system” is conscious 
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would imply that minds are either omnipresent in any causally dense region of the 
universe, if the states are observer-independent, or grossly underdetermined, as the 
ascription of causal relations and symbols is observer-dependent.  But if any one posit 
is certain for each of us, it is that our being conscious is independent of any else’s 
observation of us.  This is certainly not a welcome result for those who take 
consciousness seriously.  These are not reasonable conclusions.   
 
Secondly, compare a huge abacus and a supercomputer.  Both can serve to 
implement computations.  If mental states can be realized by variously implemented 
computational formalisms, then each system, given enough time, should be able to 
instantiate the same mental state.  Experience, though, is not atomic; experience is 
temporally structured (Blackmore, 2011).  But in what sense could these two systems 
realize the same temporally-structured phenomenology if the experience were 
dependent on contingent and transiently-available environmental stimuli, as happens, 
say, when playing music in an ensemble, coordinating in-battle military maneuvers or 
talking one’s way out of a speeding ticket?  
 
Of course, a supercomputer will process a given computational sequence 
orders of magnitude faster than much simpler machines, such as abaci.  Accordingly, 
the processes will quickly fall out of step relative to any varying 
environment/feedback process.  How can they realize the same experiences when the 
temporal dynamics of their implementations (such as their temporal sensitivities to 
input) are so different?   More generally, given that temporal and information-density 
dynamics are defining features of, arguably all, mental states, in what sense could 
implementation substrates with vastly different processing capacities generate 
equivalent experiences?  Examples will sharpen the picture.  Whereas the three 
musical notes A – C – E, if they are presented quickly enough, can generate the 
expectation of a return to A, or simply an appreciation of the A-minor chord, this will 
not happen at slower sampling/presentation rates.  Similarly, the phenomenology of 
watching films is obliterated if the still images occur too slowly.  The general reason 
is that, in these and other cases involving perception and perceptual illusion, there are 
temporal dynamics that must obtain in order to generate key gestalt effects.  Without 
such temporal dynamics, the relevant phenomenology is absent.  
 
Thus, the problem for a proponent of a thin theory of implementation is that 
“processing speed,” “energy throughput,” and “resource efficiency” are key 
constituents of causal individuation: the informational, energetic, and resource 
efficiency capacities of a system critically inform its causal topology (cf. Eliasmith, 
2002).  A thin theory of implementation cannot recognize these essential differences, 
and thus implies that adult human consciousness can be instantiated in a system of 
strings and paper slips.  Accordingly, in the context of consciousness, a thin theory of 
implementation seems to have consequences far too unbelievable and unmotivated to 
allow us to take it seriously.    
 
One remedy is to take a stronger view of implementation.  According to a 
thick theory of implementation, implementation details are directly relevant to the 
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realization of phenomenology.  On this view, implementing structures must have as 
many functional degrees of freedom per unit time as the system being represented, 
which requires implementation substrates have a sufficient number of structural 
degrees of freedom.  The following quote from Chalmers might be taken to suggest 
such a view: “For each neuron, there will be a memory location that represents the 
neuron, and each of these locations will be physically realized in a voltage at some 
physical location.  It is the causal patterns among these circuits, just as it is the causal 
patterns among the neurons in the brain, that are responsible for any conscious 
experience that arises” (Chalmers, 1996; p. 321; Italics added).  Among other things, 
this passage seems to imply that real physical implementation properties generate 
analogous phenomenological properties (cf. Chalmers’ (1996) principles of coherence 
and double aspect theory), that potential implementation substrates have medium-
dependent limitations, and that there are strong constraints on what materials can 
implement a given function, as determined by the design and functioning of the 
original system whose behaviors are being represented/mimicked.  On this, much 
more plausible, view, the Chinese Room, the strings and papers mentioned above, and 
many other ad hoc arrangements will not be conscious in virtue of the fact that the 
implementation substrates will fail to generate the necessary MDPs.  Such MDPs 
might include, but are not limited to, electrodynamical circuit properties, 
implementation substrate unity properties, or processing and resource capacity 
properties, e.g.   
 
The problem for the CTC advocate is that this cuts against her position, too.  It 
can motivate the conclusion that no silicon-based system can generate human-like 
experiential states, because, if we say that the physical differences between these 
systems’ implementations (which subvene differences in functional degrees of 
freedom through differences in processing speed, power, and vehicles) can ground 
mental state differences, then we are forced to hold that physical differences between 
SBS and humans can ground essential mental differences.  As we’ll see below, there 
are excellent reasons to think that this is, in fact, the case.  Perhaps the simplest 
argument is the following.  Adult human systems are categorically more complex 
than SBSs.  It is reasonable that our consciousness is generated by the most complex 
class of functions we instantiate.  Accordingly, SBSs may be debarred from realizing 
human consciousness, for the same reason that an adding machine cannot reproduce 
the functions achievable on a supercomputer in the same amount of time with the 
same amount of resources.    
 
The upshot of the present analysis is the following.  On the one hand, since 
semantic and phenomenological properties depend on informational processing 
functions that require causal underpinning, it is implausible that systems with vastly 
different causal capacities per unit time, sharing no structural commonalities, can 
generate identical semantic and phenomenological properties.  Hence, the thin theory 
of implementation appears infeasible.  On the other hand, given a thick theory of 
implementation, it becomes questionable whether the specific causal underpinnings of 
human-like consciousness can be multiply realized.  We will examine this directly in 
the next section.  For now, the general problem for CTCs is that it is unclear how the 
   13 
real physical causation, which provides the essential semantics, can be assumed to be 
sufficient to multiply realize properties in systems that are quite obviously 
asymmetric in respect of not just specific MDPs, but also the number of degrees of 
freedom instantiated (also an MDP).  Assuming that SBSs can generate the requisite 
causal, and hence semantic properties, is an article of faith that type-physicalists can 
justifiably argue either, at best, begs the question, or, given the empirical conditions 
under which awareness is generated (below), is false.    
 
Third, it might be objected that my arguments are orthogonal to Chalmers’ 
key commitments.  He claims that implementation properties subvening 
computational formalisms (specifying causal organization changes) suffice for 
mentality.  He does not say either 1.) how the TCS comports with physicalist 
approaches as such, or 2.) whether his account portends practical success in 
generating “artificial consciousness.”  I am sympathetic to these points, especially the 
second.  Chalmers is a very astute and careful thinker, and has guarded himself well.  
Perhaps the letter of his message (notwithstanding the spirit) precludes the charge of 
false promises.  Since there is no room to discuss the subtleties of his metaphysical 
position re: consciousness, it must to suffice to say that granting Chalmers the 
abovementioned points is tangential to my concerns in this paper.  Either his account 
is a physicalist theory in disguise, in which case it is logically viable but empirically 
empty vis-à-vis the class of SBSs, or it is legitimately computational, in which case it 
is false.  
 
Lastly, it might be argued that Chalmers’ CC is immune to the objections I 
have offered, either because (i) I have given an incorrect account of CC, and thus my 
critique does not apply, or (ii) CC, in virtue of stipulated causal sensitivities, can 
handle medium-dependent properties.  Perhaps, e.g., “electrophysiological 
properties…are just the sorts of causal relations that, Chalmers argues, his conception 
of computation can handle…”11  These objections can best be met by introducing and 
explaining the central thesis of this paper.   
 
6. The General Critique of Computational Theories of Consciousness 
 
The foregoing discussion of Chalmers’ concept of ACO involves various 
facets of the tension involved in harmonizing the abstract with the concrete.  This can 
be reformulated as a general problem applicable to all CTCs: the inherent gap 
between medium-independent properties and medium-dependent properties.  The 
general argument against CTCs can be formulated straightforwardly.     
 
 (P1*) Computation is medium-independent.   
 
(P2*) Consciousness is medium-dependent.  
 
(P3*)  Nothing that is medium-independent suffices for the instantiation of something 
that is medium-dependent.                                                          
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for requesting clarification here.  
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(C1*) No CTC can be true.  
 
Let us look at each step of the argument.  
 
(P1*) P1* asserts that computations are individuated independently of the 
physical media in which (a particular instance of) implementation occurs.  Essentially 
computational entities, like algorithms and software programs, are medium-
independent in that their essential specification is abstract/formal, and does not 
include specific implementation details.12  In other words, since there are many 
physically asymmetrical ways to formally replicate algorithmic descriptions, there are 
many physically distinct ways to implement a given computation, hence the de facto 
multiple realizability of computation. 
 
But what is it that is to be implemented in a medium-independent manner?  
The nuts and bolts of computation, so to speak, are state-transitional sequences that 
are rule-following (Egan, 1995).  State-transitional structure is implied by the Church-
Turing thesis, which holds that anything effectively computable can be computed by 
(and hence is formally equivalent to) a Turing machine (Copeland, 2002).  Since 
Turing machines have state-transitional structures, it follows that computational 
systems will have state-transitional structures (or their formal equivalent) as well.  
And rule-following functionality is implied by recursion theory, and is required to 
permit input-output relation preservation.  If the foregoing is correct, then 
computations are fundamentally individuated by three variables: medium-
independence, state-transitional structure, and rule-following functionality.  Call this 
the Minimal Theory of Computational Individuation.13                                                          
12 More accurately, computational implementation involves only one medium-dependent (logical) 
constraint:  the medium must have enough degrees of freedom to encode the relevant computational 
descriptions.  This has been correctly noted by Piccinini and Scarantino (2011), and is implied in 
Chalmers (1996; Chapter 9).  The importance of this, as we’ll see below, follows from the fact that 
different media have different implementation limitations.   
13 An interesting ongoing debate is whether the rule-following function is necessarily semantic (i.e., 
whether computations have semantic individuation conditions).  “Traditional” approaches have 
assumed so (e.g., Shagrir, 2006; Fodor, 2008; Sprevak, 2010): they turn on considerations such as, 
“Without some semantic constraint, how can we know if transitions are rule-following?”  “In what 
sense can we meaningfully call something a “rule” unless we have a clear understanding of what 
makes it so?”  Further support for this view comes from the fact that computation is useful only insofar 
as it is representational/semantic.  Conversely, non-semantic accounts hold that representation is 
unnecessary to the concept of rule-following as such (cf. Egan, 1995; Piccinini, 2010b).  A syntactic 
rule, it is argued, still suffices as a rule.  These non-semantic accounts hold that the most general 
account of computational individuation should not advert to representational contents; the nature of the 
rules and the potential semantic values of states are further matters whose details individuate specific 
types and tokens of computation, but not computational processes simpliciter.  One unsolved problem 
for non-semantic accounts is how to usefully unpack the notion of syntactic rules (ibid.).  Is there a 
viable hybrid account?  Obviously, there is no room for a discussion, but perhaps we can distinguish 
metaphysical and epistemic notions of computation.   Metaphysically speaking, computations might be 
non-semantic, but, given the requirement of cognitive access, we must individuate usable computations 
semantically.  The idea is that if there are non-semantic “syntactic” rules, they are epistemically 
beyond our ken, and cannot be classified as computations by us, in any case.   
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Whether the Minimal Theory is correct, however, is tangential to the truth of 
P1*.  Computations, as abstractly formalized functional descriptions, are not medium-
dependent entities.  Neither Chalmers, nor any computationalist, denies that.  As long 
as a state-transitional rule-following sequence (of formal description X (mirroring the 
causal organization of Y, e.g.)) is implemented in a medium-independent manner, a 
computation (X(Y)) has occurred.  It should be clear that Chalmers’ CC, e.g., is a 
variant of this general account of computational individuation, thus answering 
objection (i) in § 5 above.14  P1*, moreover, is consonant with Chalmers’ claim that 
mental properties are organizationally invariant; thus, there is nothing contentious 
about P1* from a defender of TCS/CTC’s point of view.      
 
(P2*) P2* asserts that consciousness is a medium-dependent property.  P2 
obviously begs the question against defenders of the CTC, and therefore requires 
independent support.  I will offer two arguments, one analytical in nature (A) and the 
other empirical (B).15   
 
(A) The analytical argument for the medium-dependence of consciousness 
comes from an analysis of the nature of experience itself.  The basic idea is that 
consciousness – conscious experience – displays a fundamental unity or holism (see 
Brook and Raymont (2010) for an overview), which requires us to treat it as 
fundamentally concrete in nature. 
 
One way to argue is as follows.  Conscious experience is a self-evident 
“given.”  Even, a la Descartes, if some representational contents of experience are 
illusory, one cannot doubt one’s having an experience simpliciter.  Experience, 
moreover, requires an “experiencer”: a subject.  Subjecthood, furthermore, is 
individuated by phenomenal holism (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003; Alter, 2010; 
Dainton, 2010), which is the instantiation of a metaphysically real “strong unity:” the 
individuating condition of “objecthood” (Strawson, 2010).  Thus, subjects of 
experience – given the strong unity evident in phenomenal consciousness – are 
objects: “metaphysically real concretely existing entit[ies]” (ibid.; p. 88).   
 
Thus, the first part of the analytic argument establishes the corollary theses 
that (1) consciousness is a metaphysically real, concrete phenomenon and that (2) 
conscious subjects, given phenomenal holism, are objects.  But in virtue of what is 
something (1) real/concrete and (2) an object?  One obvious answer is that something 
is “real” (i.e., an object) in virtue of its ability to have causal impact on the world (cf.                                                         
14 Remember, for Chalmers, if “the formal state-transitional structure of the computation mirrors the 
causal state-transitional structure of the physical system,” then a causally-individuated computation has 
occurred (Chalmers, 1994; p. 4).   
15 One noteworthy argument I will not directly deploy is how a computational theory could account for 
emotional experience, given that emotions are probably the most obvious candidates for MDPs.  Prima 
facie, this is a considerable problem for computational theories, considering the qualitative 
concreteness of emotions and their neurochemical (i.e., plausibly type-physicalist) realization.  
However, there simply isn’t space to open up such a complex and vexing topic.  See Charland (1995), 
Sizer (2000), Nussbaum (2003) and Stuart (2010) for a balanced overview of the issue.   
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Collier, 2008).  Since causal impact obtains in virtue of instantiation-dependent 
properties (of a system), objects are individuated by their instantiation-dependent 
properties (IDPs).   
 
What, then, are IDPs?  Plausibly, IDPs are constitutive physical properties of 
systems/objects/processes.  Internalist/narrow-content IDPs might be contrasted with 
externalist/broad-content CDIPs (context-dependent instantiation properties), in that 
the latter are dispositional properties that depend on environmental contingencies for 
their realization.  But what can we say of the class comprised by IDPs and CDIPs?  
Given that both classes of properties depend upon the exact nature of actual and 
potential physical interactions, it seems correct to say that IDPs and CDIPs are 
subsets of the larger class, MDPs.  If so, then IDPs imply MDPs, and the analytic 
argument for P2* is thus: since concrete entities are concrete in virtue of their MDPs, 
and consciousness is self-evidently concrete, we can conclude that consciousness is a 
medium-dependent phenomenon.   
 
Now, Strawson characterizes functions as “concretely existing unities” (ibid.; 
p. 89), and so, returning to our paradigm case, Chalmers’ ACO would count as 
concrete by Strawson’s own lights.  Hence, Strawson’s analysis provides no problem 
for the TCS or CTCs in general.  But I think Strawson is wrong here.  Specifically, I 
think Strawson makes the same mistake Chalmers does – a certain metaphysical 
gratuity with abstract “objects” (a la Plato).  Functions may be concrete descriptions, 
but that is a far cry from amounting to concrete instantiations in respect of the same 
properties.  Again, reification fallacies loom.   
 
Nevertheless, the analytic argument given here does not seem to be able to 
deliver the goods.  There are at least two central objections to the analytical argument 
as presented.  One, it can be accused of begging the question in multiple respects; 
first, in assuming consciousness to be causally efficacious in order to derive that 
consciousness entails IDPs, and, second, then deducing that phenomenal holism 
entails medium-dependence.  This leads to the second problem, which is that, even if 
the outlines of a valid argument are in view, it is presented far too quickly.  The 
discussion skates over a number of contentious metaphysical and epistemological 
assumptions, whose utilization requires stronger defense.  Given that the empirical 
argument (B) is much clearer, we will shortly turn to it in lieu of trying to navigate 
these murkier waters.  
 
Before moving on, however, I think that the analytical argument does bring up 
an interesting challenge for CTCs.  Any complete theory of the mental must be able 
to explain the phenomenological holism each of us, as subjects, experiences.  If 
computations generate mental states, then coherence between mental states would 
seem to require coherence between computations.  But by what mechanism will all 
these computations cohere?  In other words, by what resources can a CTC account for 
the meta-coherence that must obtain among computations to instantiate phenomenal 
holism?   
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Say that computations are mutually coherent if it is possible to simultaneously 
implement them in the same spatiotemporal system.  Two routes of response seem 
open to the defender of a CTC.   One route is to argue that there is only one 
computation with mental properties.  There would of course be no possible conflict 
between mental states in such a case, as there would only be one complex 
computation in question.  However, there are no reasons to think such a case is 
possible, let alone plausible, and, given the self-evident diversity of mental contents 
within conscious experience, assuming that there is only a single computation might 
seem both unlikely and at odds with the practices of typical defenders of the 
computational theory of mind (cf. Fodor, 2008; and see Horst (2009) for an 
overview).   
 
The other option for a defender of a CTC is to argue that the set of 
simultaneously implemented “mental” computations will be mutually physically 
coherent.  The question is how to explain, in a non ad-hoc manner, how a theory of 
computation can generate the requisite simultaneous implementability that must 
obtain between vast numbers of physically-realized computations.  In the brain, the 
nested, hierarchical structure – evolutionarily “designed” over millions of years – 
assures a tendency towards massive mutual coherence (Simon, 1973; Werner, 2010).  
In silicon-based systems (SBSs), such massive mutual coherence must be designed 
top-down.  Given the complexity of human consciousness, it is a fair question 
whether SBSs displaying the requisite computational complexity to realize human-
like consciousness can be built.   
 
Of course, defenders of CTCs seem free to respond that the foregoing 
concerns are practical ones, and are therefore orthogonal to their theoretical claims.  
This is a fair reply.  And, insofar as such considerations about physical 
implementation constraints are potentially decisive, they will reappear in the context 
of the empirical argument.  Let us turn to it.     
 
(B) The empirical argument for P2 involves the insight that, epistemically 
speaking, it is an a posteriori matter what physical details are functionally relevant to 
the generation of consciousness (Levin, 2008; Hill, 2009; McLaughlin, 2010; 
Weisberg, forthcoming).  I want to examine two special structural properties whose 
instantiation arguably realizes/subvenes consciousness: our electrodynamical (B1) 
and our fractal (B2) nature.    
 
(B1) In examining the correlates of consciousness, one fact is uncontested: 
consciousness varies in accordance with electroneurodynamical properties.  But 
which electroneurodynamical aspects are irrelevant to the generation of 
consciousness is unknown.  Historically speaking, part of the motivation for positing 
that the mind can be understood computationally is that neurons function, in part, in a 
discrete (all-or-none firing) fashion, analogous to the digital computation 
characteristic of typical computers (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943).  But it is an open 
question whether the brain generates mental states by such discrete operations alone.     
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It has long been established that the electrical fields in the brain affect neural 
firing, which is unsurprising as electrical fields move electrically-sensitive ions 
(whose movement through neural membranes realizes both neural spikes and graded 
potentials) (Pockett, 2000).  Since neural firing, by inference to the best explanation, 
realizes (or at least subvenes) consciousness in humans, it is natural to speculate that 
the electrodynamical field generated in the brain generates consciousness-changing 
causal effects (ibid.; John, 2001; McFadden, 2002; Frolich and McCormick, 2010).16  
Key evidence comes from the use of repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, in 
which the application of electromagnetic fields has been shown to directly change 
conscious experience (Overgaard et al., 2004; Babiloni et al., 2007).  If this is correct, 
then consciousness (at least partially) depends on the instantiated electrodynamical 
field properties (EFPs) of the brain (cf. Fingelkurts et al., 2010).  It is in this sense, as 
I will argue, that consciousness is inherently medium-dependent. EFPs are crucially 
inseparable from the media they constitute because EFPs have holistic/global 
properties, such as nonlocality (Belot, 1998; Frisch, 2002) and unified physical 
continuity (Lipkind, 2005).  Given this, EFPs are necessarily MDPs.  Thus, if 
consciousness depends upon EFPs, as neuroscience suggests, then consciousness 
depends upon MDPs, and P2* is true. 
 
What, though, are EFPs, and why should they be considered to be MDPs?  In 
a review of field properties, Michael Lipkind notes the following individuating 
conditions of fields: physicality, causal nonlocality, continuity and sensitivity to 
internal parameters (ibid.).  These properties fall out of the fact that EFPs are 
electrodynamic physical forces, containing energy and momentum, applicable to each 
intra-field “point.”  Electrodynamical fields thereby affect the behavior of electro-
responsive “particles” within them, and are thus causally efficacious.  Because fields 
affect all points by a given quantity (at a particular time), they possess holistic/global 
properties, like nonlocality and continuity (Belot, 1998; Frisch, 2002).  Accordingly, 
accounting for EFPs requires instantiating holistic/global causal properties.  Given 
that the individuating conditions for EFPs and computations are largely antithetical, 
the worry for CTCs is how EFPs are to be realized in computational processes.   
 
There are two aspects of computation to consider: their abstract/formal 
characterization and their implementation conditions.  The problem, as we’ve seen, is 
this: on the one hand, it is unclear how real field causality can be captured abstractly, 
in a medium-independent state transitional sequence.  An abstract formalism is not 
the kind of entity that generates real causal properties.  And, on the other hand, 
adverting to implementation properties doesn’t seem to help either: If computational 
systems are required to implement EFP-subvening structures, then physical 
differences between SBSs and humans make such implementation highly implausible.   
 
                                                        
16 Such a conclusion is unsurprising since living systems depend on electrodynamical activity in 
manifold ways and on multiple spatiotemporal scales (Adey, 1984; West, 2006).  See, e.g., the 
abstracts from the latest (2011) Electrodynamic Activity of Living Cells conference (online at 
http://edalc11.ufe.cz/doku.php).  
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It is a question of mechanical dynamics: whether it is possible to build SBSs 
that can implement the relevant field properties required to realize the “real physical 
causality” that generates the necessary semantic properties (at least partially) 
constitutive of consciousness.  The problem with implementing the kind of EFPs 
generated in organic brains – the only structures whose capacity to realize 
consciousness is undisputed – is that SBSs, as presently conceived, are designed in a 
manner antithetical to that of natural systems.  Specifically, SBSs are designed to 
minimize EFPs, so as to maximize component independence and to minimize signal 
noise, while the components of organic systems are inherently interdependent, given 
that mutual functionality is a prerequisite for natural selection (cf. Simon, 1973; 
West, 2006; Werner, 2010).  More specifically, electrodynamics in organic systems 
are generated in an aqueous environment that serves as a conduction-enhancing 
substrate, while SBSs have no analogous field-ground (Giertz, 2010).  This is 
nowhere more true than it is in regards to the brain’s intrinsic electrodynamical field 
and its local field potentials, which have been argued to be non-instantiable in SBSs 
as currently conceived (Pockett, 2000).   
 
The basic argument of (B1) can be easily summarized.  As revealed by 
empirical experiment, consciousness depends on EFPs.  Field properties involve 
holistic physical forces.  Such properties are medium-dependent in that they 
sensitively depend upon the exact media in which they occur.  Given that 
computations are medium-independent, such field properties could only be realized 
by implementation properties.  However, due to antithetical design differences, EFP-
relevant physical differences preclude SBSs (as currently conceived) from realizing 
human-like EFPs.  Yet the hopes for CTCs are actually even worse, since there is 
another consciousness-subvening feature that greatly deepens the difficulty here 
discussed.  It is this: organic systems are inherently fractal, while SBSs are inherently 
Euclidian.    
 
(B2) A profound difference between ourselves and any SBS is that, due to our 
evolutionary design, we are intrinsically fractal, both structurally and functionally 
(cf. Iannaccone and Khokha, 1996; West, 2006; Aguirre et al., 2009; Werner, 2010).17  
SBSs are not.18  I will argue that this principal design asymmetry is decisive in                                                         
17 We are fractal in many ways.  A few structural examples (and see West et al. (1999)): we grow 
through fractal self-subdivision (i.e,. cell division).  Each proper part of us is self-similar (i.e, each cell 
contains the same DNA).  Larger structures in us are structurally fractal (lungs, circulatory system, 
central nervous system (Werner, 2010), etc.).  Lastly, our overall structure is a nested hierarchy, e.g., 
(body (organs (tissues (cells (DNA))))).  For sensorimotor examples, see Kelso (1995) and West 
(2006).  For cognitive examples, see MacCormac and Stamenov (1996) and Werner (2010).   
18 This is not to say that silicon-based systems cannot be designed with some fractal structure.  In fact, 
engineers have already created low-dimensional fractal antennae.  The problem, for CTC advocates, 
however, is that there is a profound and categorical complexity gulf between the fractal dimensionality 
of organic and inorganic systems, on the one hand, and between organic, bottom-up processes and 
inorganic, top-down ones (Collier, 2008).  Simply put, these differences stem from the fact that 
organic systems, by dint of their self-organizing nature, continually increase their fractal 
dimensionality across many orders of magnitude as they grow.  In the brain, for example, cognitive 
development is underpinned by the fractal self-organization of neural networks (Sporns, 2011).  SBSs 
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refuting CTCs, for it betokens an unbridgeable implementation gulf, which implies an 
unbridgeable semantic/intentional gap (which implies an unbridgeable 
phenomenological gap).   
 
The key fractal (F) argument is the following: 
 
(FP1) Consciousness depends upon fractal functional properties (cf. MacCormac and 
Stamenov, 1996; Gong and Leeuwen, 2002; West, 2006; Werner, 2010; Sporns, 
2011).  
 
(FP2) Fractal functional properties are generated by energy throughput within fractal 
structures (Michelitsch et al., 2009).   
 
(FL1) Consciousness depends upon energy throughput within fractal structures.  
 
(FP3)  Energy throughput within fractal structures is a MDP (ibid.). 
 
(FC1) Consciousness depends on at least one MDP.19  
 
Numerous studies have shown fractal functional properties in consciousness 
data, suggesting that they are a dynamic correlate of consciousness (MacCormac and 
Stamenov, 1996; Werner, 2010).  Fractal functional properties include scale-invariant 
power-law dynamics (such as statistical self-similarity across a wide variety of 
scales), hierarchical nesting dynamics, chaotic bifurcation dynamics, and nonlocality 
(Aguirre et al., 2009; Michelitsch et al., 2009).20   
 
It has been mathematically demonstrated that fractal functional properties, 
such as nonlocal coherence between system elements, are generated by energy 
throughput within fractal structures (Michelitsch et al., 2009).  Given this, realizing 
such real fractal functional properties requires implementing real electrodynamically-
sensitive fractal structures (cf. Bieberich, 2002).   
 
A paradigmatic electrodynamically-sensitive fractal structure is that of the 
human CNS (ibid., Werner, 2010).  In the human CNS, with the proper energy 
throughput – the electrodynamics of which are at least partially regulated by 
neurochemical circuits (Rose, 2006) – consciousness arises.  There is strong evidence 
that human CNSs generate fractal functional properties in proportion to the 
complexity of their structural fractal dimensionality (Honey et al., 2010; Sporns,                                                                                                                                                               
have no equivalent capacity for novel hardware complexification, and this underpins the gulf in 
implementation properties that explain the failure of CTCs. 
19 This suggests the following Fractal Neurodynamics Theorem: The degree of consciousness is given 
by the fractal dimensionality of the transiently sustainable electrodynamical energy throughput.   
20 These properties can be speculated to underlie numerous phenomena associated with consciousness, 
such as the self-reflexivity and unity of consciousness, on the phenomenological side, and the 
remarkable zero-lag synchronization (Pockett, 2000; John, 2001) among distant parts of the central 
nervous system (CNS) that appears to generate conscious experience, on the functional side. 
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2011).21  Accordingly, it appears reasonable to infer that the realization of 
consciousness requires the generation of real highly complex fractal functional 
properties (cf. Bieberich, 2002; Walling and Hicks, 2003; Werner, 2010).   
 
However, given that SBSs are not constructed from self-similar iterative 
processes on multiple scales (as occurs in organic systems through complex, self-
organization processes), it is arguable that complex organic systems are of 
categorically higher fractal dimensionality than SBSs.22  It is also plausible that the 
highest electrodynamical fractal structures are those comprising parts of the CNS 
(Walling and Hicks, 2003).  Given these considerations, there are very good reasons 
to believe that SBSs cannot instantiate the highest fractal functional properties of the 
human CNS.23  Therefore, if adult human consciousness is generated by the highest 
class of fractal functional properties of the human CNS (cf. Pocket, 2000; Bieberich, 
2002; Werner, 2010), then CTCs will fail on account of there being no viable 
implementation substrates that are complex enough (to realize electrodynamically-
sensitive structural properties of sufficient fractal dimensionality).  
 
The basic argument of (B2) can be easily summarized.  As revealed by 
empirical experiment, consciousness depends on fractal functional properties.  As 
shown by mathematical demonstration, fractal functional properties emerge from 
fractal structural properties.  Accordingly, computations would have to be 
implemented with the same relevant fractal structure as obtain in humans to generate 
the same consciousness-realizing fractal properties.  However, while complex, non-
equilibrium processes naturally generate fractal structures of variable complexity, 
equilibrium artifacts, such as SBSs, do not.  Thus, there is a categorical fractal 
dimensionality asymmetry that grounds a fundamental implementation/realization 
asymmetry.  It is this asymmetry that invalidates CTCs.   
   
In sum, as the arguments for (B) show, empirical evidence suggests that 
consciousness depends on MDPs that cannot be implemented in SBSs.  More 
specifically, (B) argues that consciousness depends upon fractal and electrodynamical 
field properties, both of which place severe medium-dependent constraints on the 
realization of consciousness, constraints that can not be met in SBSs.  Having derived 
P2*, let us turn to P3*.   
 
(P3*) P3* holds that entities characterized by MIPs can not instantiate entities 
characterized by MDPs.  This is a very intuitive premise.  It holds, e.g., that math 
equations explaining sound waves are not, themselves, audible – or that descriptions 
of buoyancy do not confer buoyancy thereby.                                                               
21 Evidence shows that fractal dimensionality increases in healthy growth and declines in infirmity, 
disease and old age (West, 2006).  
22 Organic systems are those in which real fractal functionality derives from real fractal structural 
properties changing over time.  This distinction is important for separating causally real fractal systems 
from causally-inert mathematical objects (e.g., Sierpinski gasket) or man-made 2D fractal antennae.   
23 This is unsurprising given the antithetical (artificial vs. natural selection) design properties.  A 
categorical fractal dimensionality difference is expected given the self-organizing nature of organic, 
but not inorganic, systems.   
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The most important issue for our purposes is whether a fundamentally 
medium-independent process like computation can realize medium-dependent 
properties.  There seem to be two possibilities.  (1) On the one hand, it may be that 
computational processes can only realize MIPs.  (2) On the other hand, it may be that 
computational processes can realize MDPs in virtue of their other properties.  Prima 
facie, it is unclear how rule-following functionality or state-transitional “structure” 
could permit the realization of MDPs.  This is perhaps most clearly appreciated in the 
context of mathematics.  Mathematical properties generally imply rule-following 
functionality and state-transitional structure, but, on their own, fail to instantiate real 
causal properties.  Thus, such computational properties can not be expected to 
generate MDPs.  One cogent reply, though, is that computations can realize MDPs in 
virtue of implementation properties.  In fact, as we’ve seen, this is exactly how 
Chalmers argues that computations can have semantic properties.   
 
Obviously, option (1) is unattractive for computationalists, as it would 
severely limit what computational processes can be expected to do.  Certainly, option 
(2) provides much more wiggle room.  The problem with the second reply, however, 
is that it gives up the ship to a type-physicalist characterization.  This is because it 
grants computations the power to realize MDPs only in virtue of the physical 
properties of their implementations.   Accordingly, if consciousness is medium-
dependent (i.e., constituted by MDPs), computations will only be able to realize 
consciousness in virtue of the physical properties of their implementations, which is 
certainly not an abstract individuation condition.   
 
(C1*)  C1* asserts that no CTC can be true.  The argument is straightforward.  
Computation, as such, is medium-independent, because many structures can 
implement the same state-transitional sequence.  Consciousness, moreover, is 
arguably medium-dependent, on account of the electrodynamical field and fractal 
properties that generate it.  Accordingly, if computational processes are to generate 
consciousness, they must generate the requisite medium-dependent properties in 
virtue of implementation properties.  However, the specific structural properties 
implicated in human consciousness do not appear to be potential substrates of non-
biological implementations.  Therefore, the medium-independence individuation 
condition of CTCs cannot be met, and no CTC can succeed.    
 
7. General Argument Against CTCs: Objections and Replies 
 
Several objections can be leveled against such a broad conclusion.  Perhaps 
most obviously, the evidence used herein might be disputed, or at least questioned.   
 
However, there is nothing inherently contentious or surprising about the 
empirical claims involved.  Natural processes aggregate by fractal dynamics 
(Iannaccone and Khokha, 1996; Aguirre et al., 2009, etc.), and we are natural 
processes par excellence.  Given that functions supervene on structures (Honey et al., 
2010), it is natural to reason that as the fractal dimensionality of a structure increases, 
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so too does the functional complexity the structure is capable of subvening (Waller 
and Hicks, 2003).  Accordingly, it is no surprise that our mental lives should be made 
possible by highly fractal central nervous system properties (Werner, 2010; Sporns, 
2011).  In addition, living organisms depend on electrodynamics for most biological 
activities (Adey, 1984).  Unquestionably, the brain is the predominant 
electrodynamical organ.  Hence, it is unsurprising that our mental lives would depend 
on electrodynamical states, such as EFPs (Pockett, 2000).  So, while one might 
question the empirical claims, plausibility is in their favor.   
 
A second question is that raised as (ii) in § 5 (above): Perhaps, e.g., 
“electrophysiological properties…are just the sorts of causal relations that…[a 
CC]…can handle…”  That is, why can’t a CTC account for MDPs in virtue of a 
causal theory of individuation?  Why can’t the causal effects of fractal and 
electrodynamical organization be “written into” the computational description?  
There are several relevant considerations.   
 
As we’ve seen, for Chalmers, a viable computational account rests on 
producing the “same pattern of causal interactions” (Chalmers, 1994; 1996; p. 248).  
The short answer to the above question, then, is that the actual pattern of causal 
interactions in neurons depends on their omni-electro-responsiveness.  This means 
that patterns of causation between neurons involve the continuous fluctuation of EM 
fields in which they are embedded (Pockett, 2000; Rose, 2006).  Not only are the ions 
within and around neurons sensitive to (and move due to) electrical fields, the graded 
potentials within changing neural membranes are near-continuously sensitive to 
changes in the electrical properties of extracellular matrix (ibid.).  The EM properties 
of this space (and hence the causal organization of the neurons) are also largely 
affected by glial cells, which keep the EM field at the edge of responsiveness by 
absorbing and releasing neurochemicals (Fields, 2009).  Thus, this extracellular space 
provides a common causal influence that is not represented in the discrete modeling 
of any given neuron.  Accordingly, part of our functional organization is constituted 
by field properties that cannot be reduced to the sum of discrete states of neurons.  
These causally efficacious fields are (computationally) emergent properties. 
 
Since the foregoing neurobiological explanation might be accused of begging 
the question, let’s approach the question from a computational point of view, 
returning to Chalmers’ paradigm theory to consider what he writes about the 
implementation conditions for a combinatorial state automata (CSA), the key 
computational system for the TCS: A “system implements a given CSA if there 
exists…a vectorization of states of the system, and a mapping from elements of those 
vectors onto corresponding elements of the vectors of the CSA, such that the state-
transition relations are isomorphic in the obvious way.” (Chalmers, 1994; p. 5) In 
general, the key problems with implementing nonlocal fractal and field properties are 
that there is no way to capture such physically holistic properties in a system 1.) 
whose essential syntax is in terms of system sub-states (i.e. parts), and 2.) which 
changes in a local, discrete and sequential manner, as opposed to a nonlocal, global 
and holistic one.        
   24 
 
But what about the possibility of writing a computation such that each state 
change introduces changes in, potentially, all other variables?  It might be argued that 
this would properly recreate the “global” state effects argued to be essential.   
 
A first, epistemic, difficulty that arises is “How do we know what are the 
relevant physical states?”  By what physical taxonomy might we properly carve up 
our own structural underpinnings?  A second, further, problem is “How do we know, 
given the chaotic dynamics that are well-established aspects of our neurodynamics, 
what the relevant causal transitions are?”  It is unclear that such obstacles are 
surmountable.  For the sake of argument, though, let us imagine such difficulties can 
be overcome.   
 
A third, programming, problem awaits.  How could we create programs that 
contained the vast numbers of states that must be included?  Mental states are often 
contextually cued; accordingly, all the potential environments that might be 
encountered would have to be programmed, along with all the appropriate, but 
contingent, responses.  Note that it is quite unclear how environments and their 
dispositional architectures should be programmed.   Additionally, these contingent 
responses would have to be written in a non-transitive manner, such that the order of 
experiences would be relevant to state determination.  Again, the programming 
burdens increase.   
 
It is easy to underestimate the difficulty of the task implicated.  Even a single 
dendritic spine is the size of an amoeba, which contains approximately a million 
chemicals in semi-ordered configurations (Rose, 2006).  The activity of individual 
dendrites influences graded potentials, which themselves influence action potentials, 
which are widely assumed to be predominant, though not exclusive, mental causes.  
There are over 100 billion neurons in the human CNS, some of which have thousands 
of sites of active chemical transmission with upwards of thousands of other neurons.  
The number of potential state combinations and permutations quickly become 
mathematically intractable (NP-Hard) for the calculation of the diachronic 
development of such a network.  Now, even if such a program could be written, what 
machine is powerful enough to store all the contingent states and effectively process 
the program?  Given the complexity of the causal organization of the CNS, 
combinatorial explosion problems seem insurmountable.   
 
Of course, if nonlocal processing is required to instantiate our mental states, as 
Jerry Fodor (2008) suggests, then Chalmers’ discrete and discontinuous TCS would 
fail on those grounds.  But let us bracket this problem, granting, for the sake of 
argument, that either Fodor is wrong in his speculation or that some remedy might be 
found – if not one to which the TCS has access, then one that other CTCs might 
utilize.  
 
Bracketing all the aforementioned problems, might a CTC advocate claim that 
nonlocal and global properties can be written into computational descriptions?  It 
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seems not.  There still remains what we can call the semantic problem.  In order to 
avoid reification fallacies, computationalists must hold that computations need to be 
implemented in order to generate real (non-abstract) properties.  The implementation 
properties generate the real physical causality that provides the semantic properties 
necessary for realizing real mental states.  But here we have the introduction of 
physical properties.  The necessary semantics are generated by real forces; moreover, 
the semantic properties depend upon the relevant physical properties.  But this means 
that simply modeling, and not instantiating, certain physical properties (nonlocality, 
holism) will fail to generate the necessary semantics, just as modeling a storm will 
fail to generate rain.  The point of the implementation requirements is that the 
relevant properties must be instantiated, not merely described.  This is why nonlocal 
properties, as arise from field and fractal dynamics in the brain, cannot be merely 
written into computational descriptions.  They would thereby fail to have the 
semantic properties that make them important in the first place.    
 
A third question concerns the nature of the implementation dynamics 
required.  Would not a form of analog computation suffice to account for the 
implementation properties required to realize consciousness?  
 
Let us first note that this strategy is unavailable for Chalmers (1994), who 
specifically stipulates a discrete and discontinuous account of computation (section 
3.4).  Chalmers argues that analog computation is unnecessary because continuous 
and chaotic dynamics will wash out, at a basal enough level, as noise.  Moreover, 
since whatever turns out to be the basal functional level will be describable with a 
fine-enough grain of analysis, such continuous and chaotic dynamics will fail to “add 
anything new.”  This strategy runs into the following problems.  One, defining neuro-
activity as “noise” must post-date, rather than precede, a theory of neurodynamics, 
which is something we don’t yet have (cf. Werner, 2010; p. 14).  It is a somewhat 
empty gesture to turn an argument upon “neural noise” sans a theory of 
neurodynamics.  Two, assuming that complex and chaotic dynamics cannot “add 
anything new” is a very ironic reply, given that epistemic emergence is a sine qua non 
of complex dynamics in general.  That is, the one prediction one can make about 
complex systems (with a probability that rises in proportion to system complexity) is 
unpredictability.  And if you can be sure you can’t predict the behavior of a system, it 
rings hollow to claim a priori that the system will not generate novel behaviors.  
Lastly, and decisively, discrete and discontinuous computational processes cannot 
realize nonlocal properties, as we’ve seen.   
 
But what of analog CTCs?  Can they achieve what digital CTCs cannot?  
Analog computation can be defined as that which takes continuously varying, and not 
discrete, variables as its inputs.  Such inputs, however, are still manipulated in an 
essentially medium-independent state-transitional rule-following manner.  In order to 
qualify as a computation, there must be unambiguous input-output transitions.  This, 
however, requires unambiguous input identification.  Accordingly, the analog nature 
of the input is partial and implementation-dependent (in that greater input specificity 
requires more complex and resource-expensive hardware).    
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Now, in restricting input, part of the causal organization is discarded.  
However, for certain properties – archetypically, for MDPs – holistic causal 
preservation is an individuating condition.  Thus, for archetypal MDPs, such as 
consciousness, analog computation fails to instantiate holistic causal organization.  
Given these constraints, it can be seen that analog CTCs fare no better.  Their 
medium-independence causes them to suffer from the same problems as digital CTCs.   
 
Lastly, it might be argued that novel engineering progress might permit the 
generation of non-biological machines capable of consciousness.  There are two main 
considerations.  First, novel machines might be of a heretofore unknown structure and 
generate heretofore unknown functions.  My arguments cannot be weighed against 
this possibility; to do so would commit the fallacy of ignorance.  Second, it might be 
thought that novel SBSs are possible that might surmount the limitations I have 
enumerated.  However, I maintain that there are no good reasons to hold that non-
biological systems (systems without biological systems as proper parts) can generate 
the requisite structural and functional properties.  Why?  Very simply: the antithetical 
design principles by which living and non-living systems are generated imply 
profound structural and functional asymmetries.  As I have argued, the most relevant 
asymmetries for the question of human-like consciousness are electrodynamical field 
and fractal structural properties.   
 
In sum, I have argued that defenders of CTCs face a dilemma.  If they attempt 
to eschew computational implementation, then, given the essentially MIP-nature of 
computations, computations will fail to generate MDPs, which is problematic given 
the strong reasons to think semantic content (a fortiori, consciousness) depends on 
MDPs.  This forces advocates of CTCs to claim that computations can generate 
MDPs in virtue of implementation properties.  This latter strategy, though, accedes 
that MDPs obtain only in virtue of real physical causation.  Given the empirical 
evidence that fractal structure and electrodynamical fields are causally efficacious in 
the generation of mental properties, the inability of silicon-based computational 
systems to realize the fractal electrodynamical properties of organic brains, due to 
fundamental design asymmetries between natural-evolutionary and artificial 
processes, implies no CTC can be true.    
 
8. CTCs and the HMSMRST 
 
If the foregoing is correct, then no CTC can be correct.  What, though, is the 
relation of computational processes and silicon-based systems (SBSs)?   
 
As denoted here, SBSs refer to artifact-machines comprised of silicon and 
other non-living materials.24  Computers are the archetypal SBSs; certainly they are                                                         
24 A caveat.  My argument is tangential to the possibilities of natural-artificial system hybrids (cyborgs, 
etc.), which have natural systems as proper parts.  My argument also only holds against presently 
conceivable silicon-based systems.  (I am agnostic about what might be possible with “high-powered” 
quantum computers (which are presently of negligible computing power (8 qubits?) due to physical 
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the most sophisticated SBSs known.  Given the self-evident complexity of conscious 
experience, it is reasonable to expect that only the most complex machines might 
multiply realize (MR) it.  Accordingly, computers have been the paradigm candidates 
for subjects of artificial consciousness/experience.   
 
As currently conceived, all of the most complex electrodynamical SBSs can 
be classified as one type or another of computer (or computer-like system).  
Tautologically, computers instantiate computations.  As we have seen, computations 
are insufficient for the instantiation of consciousness.  Hence, computers are 
insufficient for the instantiation of consciousness.  Since there are no candidates for 
complex SBSs that are not computers in one guise or another, it is reasonable to 
generalize the arguments against computers to SBSs.   
 
Thus, given the assumption that only complex SBSs could even potentially 
MR human-like consciousness, and that computers comprise the class of the most 
complex SBSs, the present argument suggests that SBSs cannot MR human mental 
states.  That is, the HMSMRST is false.     
 
The general argument of this section is as follows:   
 
(C1*) All CTCs are false (§ 6). 
 
(P3*) The only plausible realization of the HMSMRST is via a CTC. 
 
(C2*)  There is no plausible realization of the HMSMRST.  
  
(C3*)  The HMSMRST is (almost certainly) false. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
With the goal of shedding some light on the question of the nature of the 
relationship between consciousness and computation, I assessed David J. Chalmers’ 
paradigm computational theory of consciousness, his thesis of computational 
sufficiency, in which the capacity of computations to capture abstract causal 
organization, paired with the organizational invariance of mental states, implies that 
the right kind of computation is sufficient for possession of a (conscious) mind.   
 
I argued that the TCS was undermined by a critically insufficient deployment 
of the concept of abstract causal organization.  The key problem was seen to be a 
dilemma arising from the tension between the concepts of “abstraction” and 
“causality.”  It forces computational approaches to depend too heavily on 
implementation properties, which are physical properties.   
                                                                                                                                                               
implementation limitations).  I am not agnostic about whether such are possible: I wager the 
implementation limitations to engineering computationally powerful quantum computers are decisive.)  
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Generalizing this problem, I introduced a general argument against 
computational approaches to consciousness based on the medium-independent nature 
of computation.  Specifically, I argued that consciousness is a medium-dependent 
phenomenon generated by medium-dependent fractal and electrodynamical field 
properties.   
 
Computational systems, I argued, cannot realize human-like medium-
dependent fractal and electrodynamical field properties in silicon implementation 
structures and so cannot generate conscious states/processes/experiences.   
 
Finally, I argued that the failure of computational theories of consciousness 
(CTCs) suggests that the Human Mental State Multiple Realizability in Silicon Thesis 
(HMSMRST) is almost certainly false.25   
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